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IPv6―Say That Three Times Fast! 
 
Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6), like its predecessor IPv4, is an Internet “addressing mechanism that defines how 
and where information such as text, voice, and video move across interconnect networks.”316  Its developers designed it “to 
increase the amount of available IP [Internet protocol] address space.”317  While recognizing that “transition is already 
underway” largely because IPv6 can greatly increase address space, the GAO also cautioned agencies that IPv6 can 
“introduce additional security risks,” such as unauthorized traffic and more direct access from the Internet.318  Fortunately, 
the DOD appears ahead of other agencies in planning for the transition to this updated Internet protocol.319  
 
 
Who Let the Data Out? 
 
In July 2005, the GAO strongly criticized the federal government for a general lack of IT security.320  Using 
sweeping language, the GAO castigated executive branch agencies for “[p]ervasive weaknesses in . . . information security 
policies and practices [that] threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of federal information and information 
systems” and that “put federal operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and destruction.”321  Though the report 
acknowledges that “the government is making progress in its implementation of FISMA,” it nonetheless asserts that agency 
weaknesses “place financial data at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of 
inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption.”322  If the IT sky really is falling across the government, 
at least it’s falling everywhere―the report attributes “pervasive weaknesses” to “24 major agencies.”323  Unfortunately, the 
report doesn’t address reactions from those twenty-four agencies to these allegations.  However, it does include a two-page 
letter from the OMB disagreeing with several GAO suggestions for the OMB,324 as well as a two-page GAO response.325  
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Siemietkowski 
 
 
Intellectual Property 
 
Trade Secrets and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
 
In Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals v. Food & Drug Admin,326 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that a contactor may sue the federal government for wrongful disclosure of trade secrets under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA).327  Although Jerome Stevens is not the first case to have such a holding,328 it is the only case disposing of the 
issue as to whether disclosure of trade secrets is a discretionary function of a federal agency.329  In the opinion, the court 
                                                     
316  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REP. NO. GAO-05-471, Internet Protocol Version 6:  Federal Agencies Need to Plan for Transition and Manage 
Security Risks Highlights (May 2005). 
317  Id. 
318  Id. at What GAO Found. 
319  Id. 
320  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REP. NO. GAO-05-552, INFORMATION SECURITY: WEAKNESSES PERSIST AT FEDERAL AGENCIES DESPITE PROGRESS 
MADE IN IMPLEMENTING RELATED STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS(JULY 2005). 
321  Id. at What GAO Found. 
322  Id. 
323  Id. 
324  Id. at 42-43. 
325  Id. at 44-45.  The report also includes a list of thirty-two GAO reports since 2002, all generally critical of federal IT security efforts.  Id. at 47-49. 
326  402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
327  28 U.S.C.S. § 1346 (b) (LEXIS 2005). 
328  See Kramer v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Army, 653 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the alleged wrongful disclosure of the name of a 
subcontractor amounted to an allegation of wrongful misuse of a trade secret, however mislabeled, within the district court's jurisdiction under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act). 
329  Jerome Stevens Pharm., 402 F.3d at 1252; see Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Government Disclosure of a Trade Secret:  A Tort Claim?, 9 NASH & 
CIBINIC REP. 6, 28 (Jun. 2005). 
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states "[t]he parties appear to agree that the disclosure of trade secrets is not a discretionary function because federal law 
prohibits it. "330  In addition, the court found that wrongful disclosure of a trade secret did not fall under the intentional tort 
exception of the FTCA. 
 
The FTCA grants federal district courts jurisdiction over claims arising from certain torts committed by federal 
employees in the scope of their employment, and waives the government's sovereign immunity from such claims.'331  Two 
important exceptions to jurisdiction and the waiver of sovereign immunity are relevant here:  the discretionary function 
exception and the intentional tort exception.332  The discretionary function exception prohibits claims “based upon the 
exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion, involved is abused.”333  The intentional tort exception prohibits 
“[a]ny  claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights.”334 
 
In Jerome Stevens, the court did not ask whether the wrongful disclosure of a trade secret fell within the 
discretionary function exception.  The court simply concluded that the parties seemed to agree that the discretionary function 
exception did not apply because federal law prohibits disclosing trade secrets.335   
 
As for the second exception, the "district court treated [plaintiff's] claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and 
breach of a confidential relationship as a claim of interference with contract rights,"336 which the intentional tort exception 
bars.337  On appeal, the DC Circuit disagreed finding that the duties underlying such claims are different.338  Unlike wrongful 
disclosure of trade secrets, claims regarding intentional interference with contracts involve an economic relationship with a 
third party.339  Consequently, the court narrowly construed the intentional tort exception to “those circumstances [that] are 
within the words and reason of the exception”—no less and no more.340    
 
After Jerome Stevens, it appears that tort relief is available to contractors when the government misappropriates or 
wrongfully discloses trade secrets.   
 
 
DD Form 882 over Substance:  Caveat Forfeiture 
 
In a case of first impression, the CAFC, in Campbell Plastics Engineering & Manufacturing v. Brownlee,341 held 
that the government may obtain title to the subject invention342 where a contractor fails to comply with FAR invention 
disclosure requirements set forth in the contract.  Harm to the government is not required in order for the contracting 
officer343 to remain within the bounds of sound discretion in demanding forfeiture. 344  
                                                     
330  Jerome Stevens Pharm., 402 F.3d at 1252 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2000); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 
(2004)). 
331  Id. (citing Sloan v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 236 F. 3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000)). 
332  See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2680 (LEXIS 2005). 
333  Jerome Stevens Pharm., 402 F.3d at 1252 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000)). 
334  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
335  Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1905; 21 U.S.C. § 331(j); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4); 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2004). 
336  Id. at 1255. 
337  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). 
338  Jerome Stevens Pharm., 420 F.3d  at 1255. 
339  Id. 
340  Id. at 1256 (citing Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n. 9 (1984) (quoting Dalenite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953))). 
341  389 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
342  35 U.S.C. § 201 defines "subject invention" as "any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work 
under a funding agreement."  35 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
343  In this case, the administrative contracting officer made the decision.  Nonetheless, he will be referred to as the contracting officer throughout this 
discussion.  Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg., 389 F.3d at 1243. 
344  Id. at 1250 (referring to the abuse of discretion test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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Campbell Plastics, a § 8(a) contractor, entered into a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the Army to develop 
components of an aircrew protective mask.  Section I of the contract incorporated by reference the FAR Clause 52.227-11, 
Patent Rights-Retention by the Contractor.  This clause "requires a contractor to disclose any subject invention developed 
pursuant to a [G]overnment contract and sets forth certain substantive requirements for doing so."345   This clause allows the 
government to "obtain title if the contractor fails to disclose the invention within two months from the date upon which the 
inventor discloses it in writing to contractor personnel responsible for patent matters."346 
 
Section I of the contract also incorporated by reference DFARS Clause 252.227-7039, Patents-Reporting of Subject 
Inventions, "which requires the contractor to disclose subject inventions in interim reports furnished" periodically.347  Most 
importantly, to report on inventions and subcontracts, the contractor was required to submit a Department of Defense (DD) 
Form 882.  Although the contractor failed, repeatedly, to disclose any subject inventions on the DD Form 882, contractor 
disclosed all technical aspects of the invention to the Army.348  The Army even admitted that it possessed an enabling 
disclosure of the invention.349  Technically, however, the contractor did not comply with the contract requirement that the 
subject invention be disclosed on DD Form 882. 
 
At the ASBCA, contractor argued that its failure to comply with the contract requirement was in "form only" and 
should not result in title forfeiture.350  The ASBCA denied contractor's appeal ruling that contractor "failed to satisfy its 
contractual obligation"351to properly inform the Army of the subject invention.  Although the Army eventually found out 
about the subject invention, this was only discovered from "its review of the patent application for secrecy determination 
purposes and its own June 1997 report," which contractor did not supply.352  Finally, the board held that FAR 52.227-11(d) 
allows the government to obtain title to a subject invention and the contracting officer in this case did not abuse his discretion 
in doing so.353  Consequently, the contractor appealed. 
 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the ASBCA.354  The court focused on the purpose behind requiring disclosure of 
subject inventions to the government within a reasonable time after it has become known to contractor personnel: 
 
Though the [Bayh-Dole] Act provides nonprofit organizations and small business firms the right to elect 
title to a subject invention, it also vests in the [G]overnment the right to a paid-up license to practice the 
invention when the contractor elects to retain title..., and the right to receive title to the invention in the 
United Stated or any other country in which the contractor has not filed a patent application on the 
invention prior to any pertinent statutory bar date.355 
 
In other words, the disclosure provisions ensure that the government has sufficient measures to protect its own 
rights.  The court found that the contract was clear in that it required the contractor disclose subject inventions on the DD 
Form 882.  The court was unsympathetic to contractor's argument that the Army had knowledge of the substance of the 
invention.  The court said that the requirement to have the disclosure on an "easily identified form . . . is sound and needs to 
be strictly enforced."356  Without rigid application of the rule, the government would never be sure of which piece of paper or 
oral statement might comprise the subject invention disclosure.357 
                                                     
345  Id. at 1244. 
346  Id. (referring to FAR 52.227-11). 
347  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 252.227-7039 (July 2004) [hereinafter DFARS]. 
348  Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg., 389 F.3d at 1246. 
349  Id.  
350  Id.  
351  Id. 
352  Id.  
353  Id. 
354  Id. at 1243. 
355  Id. at 1247 
356  Id. at 1249. 
357  Id.  
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Arguing that forfeiture is disfavored by common law, the contractor asserted that the contracting officer abused his 
discretion in insisting on forfeiture when the government is not benefited in any way by such a decision.358   The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the ASBCA to apply the four-prong abuse of discretion test of McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. 
United States by looking at: 359   
 
evidence of whether the government official acted with subject bad faith; (2) whether the official had a 
reasonable, contract-related basis for his decision; (3) the amount of discretion given to the official; and (4) 
whether the official violated a statute or regulation. 
 
The CAFC agreed with the board’s finding that the contracting officer did not abuse his discretion.  Commentators 
have disagreed with the outcome of this case, specifically criticizing the use of the McDonnell Douglas test in ascertaining 
abuse of discretion.360  In that case, a review of the factors the contracting officer actually considered occurred.361  Here, the 
ASBCA's decision does not demonstrate that such a review happened.362 
 
In conclusion, Campbell Plastics makes it clear that contractors must strictly comply with subject invention 
disclosure requirements found in government contracts to avoid forfeiture to title of invention.  It is now abundantly clear that 
form, more specifically DD Form 882, triumphs over substance. 
Major Katherine E. White 
 
 
Non-FAR Transactions 
 
DOD Issues Interim Rule Regarding Other Transaction Agreements 
 
In last year’s Year in Review, we discussed the DOD’s latest regulatory changes to its authority to enter into 
agreements that “do not comply with the normal statutory and regulatory contracting rules.”363  The Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretaries of the military departments have the authority to enter into non-traditional binding agreements for the purpose 
of research under two separate statutes.364  Title 10, Section 2358, permits the DOD to utilize grants and cooperative 
agreements for research purposes.365  Additionally, Title 10, Section 2371, permits the DOD to enter into agreements “other 
than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements” for the purpose of research; these agreements are called other transaction 
agreements (OTAs).366 
 
While the original OTA legislation did not allow a contractor performing the research to produce the item it 
researched,367 a 1993 amendment allowed that contractor to produce prototypes derived from the research.368  Later, a 2001 
amendment allowed the DOD to award a follow-on production contract, without competition, to the contractor that had 
                                                     
358  Id. at 1250. 
359  Id. at 1326 
360  Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript:  Forfeiture of Title to Patent, 19 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1, 2 (Jan. 2005).  Dave Burgett, Feature Comment:  
Federal Circuit Upholds Patent Forfeiture for Failure to Comply Strictly with Reporting Requirement, Despite Lack of Prejudice, 46 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 
44, 457 ( Nov. 2004). 
361  Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, supra note 360, at 2. 
362  Id.  
363  See 2004 Year in Review, supra note 88, at 152.  
364  See Pub. L. No. 85-599, 72 Stat. 520 (1947) and Pub. L. No. 101-189, 103 Stat. 1403 (1989). 
365  Pub. L. No. 85-599, 72 Stat. 520 (1947). 
366  Pub. L. No. 101-189, 103 Stat. 1403 (1989). 
367  Major Kevin J. Huyser et al., Contract and Fiscal Law Developments of 2003—The Year in Review, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2004, at 159-60 [hereinafter 2003 
Year in Review]. 
368  Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 845, 107 Stat. 1547, 1721 (1993).     
